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GAME-THEORY  MODELS 
FOR EXCHANGE  NETWORKS: 
Experimental  Results 
ELISA JAYNE BIENENSTOCK 
PHILLIP  BONACICH 
University of California,  Los Angeles 
ABSTRACT:  The  goal of current  exchange-network  literature  is to develop 
algorithms,  loosely based  on rational  choice,  that predict  how resources  are 
distributed  through  exchange  networks  and which positions have power to 
accumulate  resources.  These objectives  closely resemble  those of N-person 
cooperative  games  with transferable  utility,  which are  based  on formal  explicit 
models  of rational  choice.  Experimentally,  power  is exhibited  when a position 
can amass a favorable  proportion  of available  resources  by negotiating  a 
division with another  network  member.  Game-theory  solution concepts  that 
address  the question  of power  in networks  are introduced  and compared  to 
network-exchange  models to evaluate the effectiveness  of the game-theory 
solutions and those of exchange theory in predicting  results observed  in 
experiments.  Experimental  data  show that there  is a utility in incorporating 
game  theory  into the  discussion  of exchange  in negatively  connected  networks. 
Furthermore,  the  use  of  game theory leads to  a  more comprehensive 
understanding  of many processes  to which exchange  theory  is insensitive. 
There is much overlap in what is studied in the social sciences. Different disciplines 
have different theoretical orientations and different approaches. Not infrequently, 
in  two  fields  the  same  work  may  be  under  investigation  with  two  distinct 
theoretical bases and two separate vocabularies. When this occurs, it is often useful 
to take the strengths  of both fields and try to develop  a common  vocabulary  to 
understand  the phenomenon.  The contribution of this study is to incorporate the 
ideas,  techniques,  and  solution  concepts  of N-person  cooperative  game  theory 
to the study  of exchange  in negatively  connected  networks. 
Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, and Yamagishi, in their article "The Distribution  of 
Power in Exchange  Networks"  (1983), established  that some  nodes  in networks 
of exchange  could,  because  of structural position,  command  more resources  in 
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dyadic exchanges.  Cook et al. proposed  an algorithm to calculate which  network 
positions have a structural advantage. Markovsky, Willer,  and Patton, in their paper 
"Power Relations in Exchange Networks" (1988), also showed  that some network 
positions  have  structural  advantage.  They  proposed  a  different  algorithm  for 
determining which positions  have advantage. 
There are two  reasons  that  game  theory  has  been  overlooked  as a source  of 
hypotheses  for determining where power is located in networks of exchange. The 
first is that Cook et al. and Markovsky et al. share a misconception  of game theory. 
Markovsky, Willer,  and Patton (1988) specifically rule out using models of "coalition 
formation" because  they  are thought  to be incompatible  with Markovsky's basic 
assumptions.  Markovsky et al. reject game theory because  they wrongly  assume 
that "coalition formation" implies actors would  have the options  of "temporarily 
accepting  reduced  resources  while  receiving  increasingly  favorable  offers from 
others." (Markovsky et al. 1988:223,  n. 5). Markovsky et al. overlook the fact that 
when any two subjects agree to an exchange, they are in effect forming a coalition. 
In addition, the focuses of both Cook et al. and Markovsky et al. on power may 
have prevented them from seeing the relevance of rational-choice models. Rational- 
choice  models  seem  to  involve  uncoerced  decisions  by  independent,  rational 
decision  makers. "Power" seems  to play no role. However,  it is questionable  to 
us whether  research on exchange  networks really needs  the concept  of power at 
all. The only  consequence  of unequal  power  in exchange  networks  is unequal 
outcomes.  The game-theory  models  we  will describe  directly predict outcomes, 
without  the unnecessary  intervening  variable of power. 
Game theory  is firmly based  in rational choice. While it is true that the grand 
purpose  of  exchange  theory  may  be  to  study  social  exchange  in  general,  the 
experiments  used by both Cook et al. (1983) and Markovsky et al. (1988) involve 
purely  economic  exchanges.  Both  studies  assume  their  subjects  will  behave 
rationally (Cook et al. 1983:286;  Markovsky et al. 1988:223).  In addition, both studies 
attempted  to  control  any  experimental  feature  that  could  induce  nonrational 
behavior. 
In many  ways,  the  assumptions  of  "rational" behavior  that  Cook  et  al. and 
Markovsky et al. propose  are more constrained then those  of game theory. Cook 
et  al. and  Markovsky  et  al. make  specific  prescriptions  of  exactly  the  type  of 
bargaining  strategy  subjects  should  use  if they  are being  rational (Cook et  al. 
1983:286;  Markovsky et al. 1988:223).  Any  deviation  from this predicted  behavior 
is attributed to subjects being influenced by nonrational extraneous concerns. This 
limited perception  of rational choice unnecessarily  confines their theories. 
Game theory is based on formal explicit assumptions  of rational choice that are 
general enough  to allow for adaptation to many different situations. Game theory 
is not  one  predictive  theory; it is a collection  of solutions  that are parsimonious 
enough  to have  interpretive value  for many  situations. In addition, the different 
solutions, while all based on the assumption  of rational choice, focus attention on 
different aspects of rational choice and have different emphases. The view of Cook 
et al. (1983:286)  that discussion  of equity concerns are outside the realm of rational 
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choice  is  incorrect.  The  Shapley  value,  one  game-theory-solution  concept,  is 
considered  an equity  solution  (Rapoport 1970:48).  In this article, game  theory  is 
incorporated into the literature of exchange in negatively  connected  networks, not 
only because it can predict patterns of exchange in negatively  connected  networks 
but  also  because  game  theory  allows  for insights  into  the  implications  of  the 
structures  of networks  that  current  models  are not  sensitive  to.  This  study  is 
intended to show that game-theory-solution  concepts do as good a job, if not better, 
than existing algorithms in predicting who will get more points in exchanges  and 
who  exchanges  with whom. In addition, it shows  that incorporating game theory 
into the discussion  allows for a more insightful investigation  of exchange networks. 
COOK AND  EMERSON 
By incorporating networks  into exchange  theory, Emerson (1972) was the first to 
extend  exchange  theory  beyond  the  dyad.  Cook,  Emerson,  Gillmore,  and 
Yamagishi (1983) developed  these  ideas further. The purpose  of their article was 
to  discover  how  to  "best  integrate  network-structural  principles  and  power- 
dependence  theory  to  explain  the  dynamics  of power  in  exchange  networks" 
(1983:289).  They used Emerson's (1972)  definition of exchange networks as a starting 
point: 
An exchange  network can be defined as consisting  of: 
1.  A set of actors. 
2.  A distribution of valued resources among these 
actors. 
3.  For each  actor, a set  of exchange  opportunities  with  other  actors in  the 
network. 
4.  A set  of historically developed  and utilized  exchange  opportunities  called 
exchange  relations. 
5.  A set of network connections linking exchange relations into a single network 
structure. 
Thus, an "exchange  network" is formed by  two  or more connected  exchange 
relations between  actors, with "connections" defined as follows: 
Definition:  Two  exchange  relations between  actors A-B  and actors B-C 
are connected  to form the minimal network A-B-C  to the degree that 
exchange  in one relation is contingent  on exchange  (or nonexchange)  in 
the other relation. (a) The connection  is positive if exchange in one relation 
is contingent  on exchange  in the other. (b) The connection  is negative  if 
exchange in one relation is contingent  on nonexchange  in the other. (Cook 
et al. 1983). 
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As  an  illustration  of  power  differences  in  negatively  connected  networks, 
consider  Network  I in Figure 1. Imagine  this  is a monogamous  world  and  the 
exchange relation is marriage or dating. 'D'ebbie has two options: 'B'ob and 'E'ddie 
will bid to make themselves  more attractive to her. Since Debbie has alternatives, 
she  is in a more powerful  position  then  the men. All of the algorithms (network 
and  game-theoretic)  for determining  power  in  negatively  connected  networks 
agree that D is the most powerful person in this simple three-person  network. 
If we  add  'A'lice and  'C'arol to form a more complex  network  (Network  II in 
Figure 1), different approaches  yield  different results. In this  network,  Bob has 
options  and is no longer  completely  dependent  on  Debbie. It is now  no  longer 
obvious  in which position  power is concentrated. 
To determine where power is located in a network, Cook et al. (1983) developed 
an experiment.  The experiment  placed people  in network  positions  and allowed 
connected  pairs to negotiate  over the  division  of a preset  allocation of points.  If 
a pair could  agree on a division  of points, they  would  receive  the points.  Points 
were  later converted  to  money.  The  assumption  was  that  people  in  powerful 
positions  would  use that power to obtain more points. 
Cook et al. (1983) developed  a measure to determine network-wide  dependence. 
In Network I in Figure 1, there is no reduction in the value of the network if either 
B or E (but not both) is removed. For example, if the value of an agreement between 
any two connected  positions is worth 24 points, then the removal of either position 
B or E does nothing to reduce the value of the network. If either B or E is available, 
there is still the potential  for a payoff of 24 points. In Cook 's terminology,  there 
would  be  no  reduction  in maximum  flow  (RMF). However,  when  D leaves  the 
network, no agreements can be made and the value of the network is 0. This means 
that B and E are dependent  on D to complete  the transaction and if B is not an 
active participant nobody  profits. Looking at Network  II in Figure 1, where  it is 
possible  to make two  agreements,  the maximum  resource flow (MRF) is 48. If B 
or D or E is removed, for example, the reduction in maximum flow is 24; removing 
any  one  of these  positions  would  make it impossible  for two  agreements  to be 
completed.  If either A or C is removed,  the  RMF is 0, and the  network  can still 
achieve  a joint value  of 48. In graph-theoretic  terms, Cook et al. are using  point 
vulnerability to model this process. 
One problem with  using reduction  in maximum flow as the only indication of 
power is that to exercise power in a network, a person has to remove him/herself 
entirely from the transaction and accept no exchanges. In other words, by the RMF 
measure, power  can only be expressed  at the expense  of gain. A better measure 
of power  would  give the powerful position  the ability to exercise power  and still 
profit in an exchange round. In other words, a powerful position could affect others' 
power  without  sacrificing its  own  profit by  removing  certain connections  and 
depriving  some  members of the network of the benefit of its value while keeping 
other options  open.  Cook, Gillmore, and Yamagishi (1986) revised  their measure 
by  combining  the  concept  of point  vulnerability  (RMF) with  line  vulnerability 
(CRMF), the Cost of RMF. Line vulnerability is the ratio of the minimum  number 
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of lines that need to be removed in order  for a position to exercise  power and its 
total number  of connections. 
The final  measure  is known as DNi. 
CRMFi  =  (Number of lines that need to be removed to exercise power to its 
potential)  / (Number  of lines connected to point i). 
DNi =  RMFi  X (1 -  CRMFi). 
As an illustration  of how this is computed,  observe the 
distribution  of power in Network II of Figure  1: 
C=  OX(1-1/1)=  0 
B =24X  (1 -2/3)=  8 
A=  OX(1-1/1)=  0 
D=  24 X (1 -  1/2)=  12 
E =  24 X (1 -1/1)=  0 
In this network,  position D seems to have the most power,  followed  by position 
B. Positions  A, C, and E appear  to have the same power. The hierarchy  of power 
for this network  according  to the Cook,  Gillmore,  and Yamagishi  (1986)  algorithm 
is D > B > A = C = E.  These result are counterintuitive,  particularly  because they 
find the power of E to be equal to that of A and B. 
W.I TFR  AND MARKOVSKY 
Markovsky, Willer, and  Patton (1988) have  developed  another method  of 
determining  power in negatively connected exchange networks,  which they call 
Elementary Theory. Implicitly, their method  is  also  based  on  power  and 
dependence:  the more options a position has, the more power the position has, 
if these options do not themselves have options. In Network I in Figure  1, Debbie 
has power because she is connected to two people without alternatives.  Once Bob 
has an alternative,  Debbie's  position weakens.  If Alice and Carol  had alternatives, 
this would strengthen Debbie's position by weakening Bob's.  The Markovsky- 
Willer-Patton  approach  is based on two steps: the computation  of a power index 
and the predictions  about who will trade  with whom based on this index. In their 
power index, paths with an odd number  of links have a weight of +1, paths with 
an even number of links have a weight of -1,  and only paths of the same length 
with completely  disjoint  sets of members  are  counted.  The power of a point i, p(l)4 
is indexed by the sum of the weights of the paths emanating  from  point i. Letting 
mik  be the number of paths of length k that start at position i, Markovsky  et 
al.(1988:224)  state: 
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AXIOM I: 
p(l)i =  k(-l-)k'mik  (1) 
The second  step  involves  dividing  the  network  into  subgraphs  of individuals 
who will want to trade with one another. This is done through the following axioms 
(Markovsky et al. 1988:225): 
Axiom II:  i seeks  to trade with j if and only  if i's power  is greater than j's, 
or if i's power  relative  to j's  equals  or exceeds  that  in  any  of i's other 
relations. 
Axiom HI:  i and j can exchange  only if each seeks exchange  with the other. 
Axiom  IV:  If i and j exchange,  then  i receives  more resources than j if and 
only if i has more power than j. 
The results for the five-person  network discussed  above are: 
A  =  1-1+1=1 
B=3-1  =2 
C  =1-1+1=1 
D=2-1  =1 
E  =  1-1+1=1 
In other words, only  position  B has power; all other positions  are equal. Thus, 
the hierarchy of power  by this measure for this network  is B >  A =  C =  D =  E. 
This also seems  counterintuitive.  It seems  that D and E should in some way have 
more power then A and B. 
Like Cook et al.,  Markovsky et al. designed  an experiment  to test their theory. 
While many details of the experiment  differed from those  of Cook et al. the basic 
structure of both experiments  was the same. Subjects were asked to negotiate  to 
decide how  to divide a preset allocation of points, (usually 24 points,) that would 
later be converted  to money.  Only connected  pairs could negotiate. Each subject 
received  the amount  agreed upon. Only  one  agreement  per round was  allowed. 
ASSUMPTIONS  OF RATIONALITY 
Cook et al. and Markovsky et al. both had rational-choice models for how subjects 
would  make decisions.  Cook et al. predicted that subjects would  act in a "rational 
way" and explained rational as follows: 
This assumption (rational  choice) is necessary theoretically  since it allows us 
to  derive testable predictions concerning manifest power from principles 
dealing  with potential  power.  In  our  experimental  setting  by "rational"  we mean 
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that each actor in the network explores alternative  sources of benefit in the 
network  (a)  through  extending  offers  to others  and (b)  by comparing  offers  and 
counter offers  from others. Each  actor maximizes  benefit by (a) accepting  the 
better  of any two offers,  (b) lowering  offers  when offers  go unaccepted,  and (c) 
holding out for better offers  when it is possible to do so (Cook  et al. 1983:286, 
n. 12). 
These assumptions  are very similar to the "axioms" of Markovsky et al. (1988:223, 
n. 5), who  say of their "actor conditions," which presuppose  their axioms: "These 
conditions  allow  a  variety  of  more  deterministic  rational  or  quasi-rational 
strategies." Ironically, Markovsky et al. rule out the use of game theory (specifically, 
coalition theory) as an avenue. 
GAME-THEORY SOLUTIONS 
Networks  I, III, and IV in Figure 1 illustrate how  these  solutions  can be applied 
to negatively  connected  networks. All the solutions  discussed  are solutions  to the 
game in characteristic function form.' Consider a set of players N. A characteristic 
function  v assigns  to every  subset  of players  S a total payoff v(S) that they  can 
realize among  themselves  despite  the  actions  of the  other  players  (Kahan and 
Rapoport 1984:26-27).  In the network games we are considering, the characteristic 
value for any subset  of players will be their maximum total payoff if the network 
consisted  only of the connections  among these players. For example, for the three- 
person  chain in Network  I of Figure 1, v({BE})  =  0 because  B and E cannot  trade 
with one another, but v({BDE})  = 24 because this set could guarantee itself 24 points 
if D were  to trade with  B or E. Table 1 contains  the characteristic function  form 
of the negatively  connected  network game for Networks  I and III of Figure 1. 
Each game-theoretic  solution is based on concepts  of rationality. There are three 
kinds of rationality commonly  distinguished  in the coalition literature: individual 
rationality,  coalition  rationality,  and  group  rationality  (Rapoport  1970:88-90.) 
Individual  rationality  is the assumption  that no individual in a coalition will accept 
less  than what  he  can earn alone. If there is a payoff vector x =  (xi, X2,  X3,  ..., 
xn),  then: 
xi > v(i); i =  1, 2,...,  n. 
Coalition  rationality  is the same assumption  with  respect  to coalitions; no set of 
actors S will accept less in total than what  they  can earn in a coalition together. 
liesxi >  v(S) for all S C N 
Finally, group rationality  is the  assumption  that the  set  of all actors, the  grand 
coalition, will maximize their total reward. 
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TABLE 1 
The Characteristic  Function  for Two Networks 
Network  Characteristic  Value  Function 
3-person  Chain  v(0) = 0 
v(B) = v(D) =  v(E) = v(BE) =  0 
v(BD) =  v(DE) =  v(BDE) =  24 
4-person  Chain  v(0) = 0 
v(A) =  v(B) =  v(C) = v(D) =  v(AC) = v(BD) =  0 
v(AB) =  v(BC) =  v(CD) =  v(ABC) =  v(ABD) =  v(ACD) =  v(BCD) =  24 
v(ABCD)  = 48 
XiENXi =  v(N) 
All the theories discussed  will assume individual rationality. How important or 
predictive the other types of rationality are will be a contribution of this experiment. 
The Core 
Intuitively, the Core is the "the set of all feasible outcomes  that no coalition can 
improve upon" (Lloyd Shapley, personal communication, October, 1989).  No group 
of players will accept an outcome if by forming a coalition they can do better. Formally, 
the core consists of outcomes  that have individual, coalition, and group rationality. 
The importance  of a core for the experiments  described  above  is that Cook et 
al. and Markovsky et al. assume that their networks will reach an equilibrium. Cook 
et al. assume that over time, the more powerful members of networks will exercise 
their power over the others and eventually  an equilibrium will be reached. Once 
this is obtained, Cook et al. predict that the values will remain the same. Markovsky 
et al. predict that, based  on their axioms, a group of rational actors will quickly 
decide how  to "ration" the points. They also predict an equilibrium. 
The  game  theorist  would  have  to  look  at  the  characteristic function  of  the 
network game to decide if there is a core before making predictions about reaching 
an equilibrium. If there is a core, the game theorist would predict that, once a core 
solution is stumbled  upon, it is unlikely that any individual or coalition would  be 
willing and able to produce a disruptive change. If there is no core, the game theorist 
would  have no reason to expect that the game would  ever be stable. 
Network  IV in Figure 1 is an example  of a network  without  a core. If all the 
pairings have  the  same value,  the  network  is unstable  for the  following  reason: 
If A agrees to exchange with B, then C is excluded and receives no points. C would 
want to improve  his/her situation and receive more than zero points  so C would 
make an offer to either A or B that promised more points than the other exchange. 
If either A or B would agree to exchange with C, the other would receive no points. 
If B was excluded, B would then make an offer to either C or A that would improve 
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their take. This could  go  on  forever. The excluded  person,  by  offering a player 
engaged  in an exchange  more than  s/he  would  receive  in that exchange,  could 
cause the coalition to unravel. When there is no solution  that some player or set 
of players cannot improve on, there is no core. When there is no core, there should 
be no  expectation  of stability. If there is no core, it would  be difficult to decide 
if any position  could exercise power and command resources. 
To compute  the core, the characteristic function is plugged  into the equations 
for rationality. The objective is to find a solution that is simultaneously  individually, 
coalition- and group-rational. For Network  I in Figure 1, the core is D =  24, B = 
E =  0. No  other set of values  satisfies all the inequalities.  For Network  III, there 
is a range of possibilties  in the core. A and B exchange,  C and D exchange,  and 
B +  C >  24: the middle positions  B and C have an advantage. 
The Shapley Value 
The Shapley  value  is based  upon  four assumptions  that are desirable criteria 
for a solution: 
1.  The value should be feasible and efficient. 
2.  The value should be symmetric if the game is symmetric. 
3.  The  value  should  award  nothing  to  "dummy"  players  who  contribute 
nothing  to the coalition. 
4.  If two characteristic functions are added, then the sum of their values should 
be the value of their sum. 
Intuitively, it can be understood  as the payoff configuration that awards to each 
player that player's marginal worth to the coalition. A computational  method  for 
finding the Shapley value that uses this intuitive definition is the method of random 
orders. Consider all n! random orders of the n individuals  in the set of players N. 
For each ordering, tally the additional value made by each player as s/he  enters 
a coalition.  For each  player, sum  his/her  total  contribution  for all n! orderings. 
Dividing this sum by n! gives  the Shapley value for each player. 
For example, consider the three-person  chain network in Figure 1. There are six 
permutations.  Each node  is entered sequentially. When a node  entered increases 
the value of the coalition, that node receives the value added. Table 2 is an example 
for the  three-person  chain  network.  In the  first permutation,  B enters  first and 
contributes no value since the characteristic function value is B = 0. Next D enters. 
Because v(BD) = 24, the added value of D is 24 points. Last D enters. D contributes 
nothing  so D receives  credit for no points. The order of entry into the agreement 
is on the left side of the table; the values received for each node are tallied on the 
right. The Shapley value is computed by taking the total for each node and dividing 
it by the total possible  points contributed.2 
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TABLE  2 
Shapley  Value  for  the 3-person  Chain 
Sequence  entered  Points  added 
First  Second  Third  B  D  E 
B  D  E  0  24  0 
B  E  D  0  24  0 
D  B  E  24  0  0 
D  E  B  0  0  24 
E  B  D  0  24  0 
E  D  E  0  24  0 
Totals:  24  96  24 
Shapley  value:  1/6  2/3  1/6 
The Kernel 
Unlike the core and the Shapley value, which assume that any coalition structure 
that forms will be group-rational, the  kernel makes no  predictions  about which 
coalitions  will form and does  not  assume  group rationality. The kernel predicts 
only the distribution of rewards, given  some assumption  about the memberships 
of all coalitions (Kahan and Rapoport 1984:128-134). 
To  calculate  the  kernel,  we  assume  a  complete  coalition  structure  and  a 
hypothetical  distribution  of rewards within  each coalition. We then  ask whether 
this distribution is in the kernel. Consider two players k and 1  in the same coalition. 
In this context, it means that the two players have agreed to trade with one another. 
Both k and 1  consider alternative trading partners. The maximum surplus of k over 
1,  SkJ is the maximum increase in reward to k and to any alternative trading partner 
j with  respect to the present  distribution if k and j agree to trade. Similarly, slk is 
the maximum increase in reward to 1 and some alternative trading partner j with 
respect  to the  present  distribution  of rewards if 1 were  to agree to trade with  j. 
A reward distribution is in the kernel if ski  =  sk for every pair of players who  are 
trading. 
The appeal of the kernel is that it might model the way players in these networks 
actually  determine  how  much  they  are willing  to ask. In Network  I in Figure 1, 
for example, D will trade with B or E and will try to take the entire 24 points. This 
is calculated  as follows.  Assume  D is considering  an exchange  with  B in which 
B receives x points and D receives 24-x.  Being left out of any trade, E would receive 
nothing.  If D trades with  E instead  of B, his/her  potential  additional  profit from 
the  change  is 24 -  (24 -  x) -  0 =  x =  SDB. B has  no  one  else  to trade with,  so 
s/he would suffer a loss of -x  = SDB. Equating these two surpluses (x = -x),  it follows 
that x = 0. The kernel for this network is B = 0, D =  24, E =  0.  The kernel seems 
an elegant formalization of the power/dependence  model of power. The quantity 
-Sab is a's dependence  on b;  it shows  how much a might lose in the best alternative 
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relation. Equating sab  and sba  shows  the outcome  after power  has been  equalized 
(Emerson 1972). 
THE EXPERIMENT 
As subjects arrived, they were ushered into private cubicles with terminals. They 
were  asked  to sign  a human  subject's release briefly describing  the  experiment 
and to wait until the  experimenter  returned. When  all the  subjects  had arrived, 
the experimenter went  to each cubicle with index cards that were to be selected 
by  the  subjects  to  determine  their network  position.  In this way,  the  subject's 
position in the network was randomly determined. The experimenter then started 
the  terminal and gave  brief verbal instructions  on how  to progress through  the 
instructions and to notify the experimenter in the event of a computer malfunction 
or some  other problem. After all the subjects had been  oriented in this way, the 
experimenter  observed  the  transactions  from  the  control  room.  The  game 
commenced  when  all  subjects  completed  the  instructions.  There  were  three 
networks:  the  four-person  chain  (Network  III in  Figure  1), the  five-person  T 
(Network II), and the five-person  hourglass (Network V). 
There were 10 sessions  for each of the networks. Each session  was divided  into 
a series of games.  The number  of games  per session  varied. Each group played 
as many  games  as it could  conclude  in one  hour. Each game  consisted  of from 
one to five rounds where bargaining occurred. Each round consisted of three stages: 
the offer stage, the acceptance stage, and the confirmation stage. 
To avoid confusion, a rigid structure was developed  within which subjects could 
bargain that would  ensure no subject could make more then one agreement  per 
game.  In the  first stage,  subjects  could  made  offers to  all eligible  (connected) 
positions. At the next stage, all subjects were informed regarding who made them 
offers and reminded  what  offers they  had made. They would  then  either allow 
the  offers they  had made  to stand, keeping  them  available to other subjects, or 
they  would  accept  an offer. If they  accepted  an offer, their standing  offers were 
nullified. The last phase  of the round was  the confirmation stage. At this phase, 
the person who made the offer could either chose among competing offers or decide 
not  to confirm any  offers. This guaranteed  that each  person  made  at most  one 
exchange, and it gave the one making an offer a chance, in a game, to rethink his/ 
her original offer. If a dyad agreed, they  sat out subsequent  rounds until the end 
of the game. All subjects were informed of which positions were no longer eligible. 
Subsequent  rounds continued  so that players could negotiate  an agreement until 
either all players were ineligible or five rounds  had been  completed.  At the end 
of a game, if there was time remaining, another game commenced. 
RESULTS 
For each of the three networks in the experiment, we examine who traded with whom 
and which  positions  had the most power  (earned the most points) in exchanges. 
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The Four-person Chain Network 
Who Trades with  Whom? 
Three of the competing theories make predictions regarding who exchanges with 
whom:  Elementary  Theory, the  Shapley  value,  and  the  core. The core and  the 
Shapley value theories assume group rationality; therefore, no exchanges between 
positions  B and C should occur. The prediction of Elementary Theory is that there 
should  be no trading preferences  at all: B and C should  not desire to trade with 
each other any less than with the outer positions. 
To test whether  positions  B and C exchanged  more frequently  with  the outer 
positions  than with  each other, it was  necessary  to show  that positions  B and C 
exchanged  with  each other less often than they would  based on a chance model. 
Position  B has a 50 percent  chance  of choosing  position  C. Similarly, position  C 
has a 50 percent  chance  of choosing  position  B. Since to conclude  an agreement, 
both  must  agree to choose  each  other simultaneously,  the  probability of B and 
C engaging in an exchange with one another is 25 percent. If the Elementary Theory 
solution  is to be confirmed, the  two  inner positions  should  exchange  with  each 
other 25 percent  of the time. If the core and Shapley  value  predictions  are to be 
confirmed, the data must show  that the two center positions  exchange  with each 
other less often than 25 percent. 
If the only theory under consideration were the Elementary Theory prediction, 
a two-tailed  test  would  be  used.  However,  the  purpose  of  this  research  is  to 
compare  hypotheses.  The core predicts  that trades between  positions  B and  C 
should  occur less than 25 percent of the time. Therefore, the hypothesis  is stated 
as a one-tailed  test. A rejection of the null hypothesis  would  confirm the core and 
Shapley  value  predictions.  Not  rejecting the null hypothesis  would  support  the 
Elementary Theory prediction. 
The actual average percent of B-C  trades across the ten groups in this condition 
was .16. The null and alternative hypotheses  were: 
Hypothesis  0:  p >  .25. 
Hypothesis  1:  p <  .25. 
The results were  t9 =  -2.05,  a <  .05, one-tailed.  The t-test shows  that the null 
hypothesis  can be rejected, lending support to the core prediction. The Elementary 
Theory prediction is rejected at a .05 level. Trades between  one outer position and 
one inner position  are preferred to exchanges  between  two inner positions. 
Who Gets More? 
The  second  question  addressed  is: who  receives  more  points?  The  levels  of 
prediction  of the  different competing  theories  differ. Below is a summary  of the 
predictions  of each theory for this network, the four-person chain: 
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TABLE  3 
Average  Points in Exchanges  in Four-person  Chain 
Middle-End  (B-A  and  C-D)  Middle-Middle  (B-C) 
Difference  4.64  .72 
df.  9  6 
T-test  2.48  .41 
a  .05  ns 
Core:  B + A >  24.  The sum of the earnings of B and C will be greater than 
or equal to 24. 
Shapley  Value:  A =  10, B =  14, C =  14, D =  10. 
Kernel: A =  8, B =  16, C =  16, D =  8, when  A exchanges  with  B and C with 
D. 
Power/Dependence:  The interior positions  have power. 
Elementary  Theory: All positions  have equal power. 
This can be summarized by the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis  2:  The  core,  kernel,  Shapley  value,  and  power/dependence 
theories all predict that the center positions  have an advantage. 
Hypothesis  3:  Elementary Theory predicts that there are no advantages  to 
any position. 
The average  points  for trades between  dyads  are given  in Table 3. In all ten 
groups,  there  were  middle-end  trades.  The  average  of  all  groups'  average 
differences  was  4.64 points  in  favor  of  the  central  position.  This  difference  is 
statistically  significant  (t9 =  2.475,  ax  <  .05). In seven  groups,  there were  trades 
between  the  middle  positions  B and  C. The average  B -  C difference was,  not 
surprisingly, insignificant. These results support Hypothesis  2. 
The Five-Person T Network 
Who Trades With Whom? 
Three theories make predictions regarding who exchanges  with whom: the core, 
the Shapley  value, and Elementary Theory. All make the same prediction  about 
trading preferences: they  predict that there is no reason for positions  B and D to 
exchange; therefore, no exchanges  between  positions  B and D should occur. This 
is tested  against the null hypothesis  that there are no trading preferences. 
Position B has a 1/3 chance of choosing  position  D; position  D has a 1/2 chance 
of choosing position B. Since to conclude an agreement, both must agree to choose 
each other simultaneously,  the probability of B and C engaging  in an exchange 
with one another is 1/6. If the null hypothesis  is to be confirmed, positions  B and 
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D should  exchange  1/6 of the time. If the prediction of the two  theories  (the core 
and Elementary Theory) are to be confirmed, the data must show  that these  two 
positions  exchange  with each other less often the 1/6. 
For the Five-person  T, there is only one hypotheses  under investigation: 
Hypothesis  4:  The core and Elementary Theory predict that positions  B and 
D will exchange  less often than chance: less than 1/6 of the time. 
The average percent  of games  in which  B and D traded was  13 percent. This 
is less than 1/6, but not significantly so. In eight of the ten groups, the proportion 
of games  with  B-D  trades was  less  than 1/6. The failure to achieve  significance 
is largely due to one outlying group. In this group, 54 percent of the games involved 
B-D  exchanges.  Using  a  one-tailed  sign  test,  the  null  hypotheses  that  the 
probability of B-D  trades is greater than or equal to 1/6 can be rejected at the 
almost significant .056 level. 
Who Gets More? 
The predictions  of the theories are as follows: 
Core:  A = C = 0: B = 24: D + E = 24.  Position B receives all points in trades 
with A and C. D and E trade on equal terms. 
Shapley  Value:  A =  C =  3.2, E =  11.2, D =  13.2, B =  17.2.  Position B is more 
powerful than A or C, and D is more powerful than E. 
Kernel: When B and D do not exchange, A = C = 0, B = 24, D = E = 12.  When 
B and D do trade, B =  D =  12. 
Power/Dependence:  A, C, E <  B <  D.  In trades with A and C, B receives more 
points.  In a D-E  trade, D should  do better than E. In a B-D  trade, D 
should  do better than B. 
Elementary  Theory: A, C <  B, D =  E.  B should  receive  more than  half the 
points in trades with A or C. D and E should trade on equal terms. 
The predictions are summarized in Table 4. A broken line means that the theory 
does  not  make  a  prediction  about  that  dyad.  An  asterisk  means  that  the 
TABLE  4 
Dyadic  Predictions  of Theories 
B versus  A and  C  B versus  D  D versus  E 
Core  B>Aor  C  *  D=E* 
Shapley  Value  B > A or C * 
Kernel  B>Aor  C *  B=D*  D = E * 
Power/Dependence  B > A or C *  D>  B  D > E 
Elementary  Theory  B > Aor C *  D = E * 
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TABLE  5 
Five Person  T:  Dyadic Comparisons  for  each Session 
B-A  B-C  B-D  D-E 
Difference  3.66  4.40  .66  1.03 
df.  9  9  6  9 
T-test  2.22  2.19  .26  .67 
a  .05,  one-tailed  .05,  one-tailed  ns  ns 
corresponding  null  or alternative  hypothesis  was  confirmed,  according  to  the 
results  presented  in Table 5. These  results  show  that all the theories  performed 
about equally. All of them correctly predicted B's power over A and C. 
The Five-person  Hourglass: A Different Type of Network 
The four-person chain and the five-person  T networks  had cores, but the five- 
person hourglass network does not. Consequently,  the core makes no predictions 
concerning resource distribution in this network. The absence of the core suggests 
no stable solution. An assumption  of the exchange  theory  experiments  was  that 
there was a "stable phase of power use" (Cook et al. 1983:285)  or an "equilibrium 
point" (Cook et al. 1983:287).  It was assumed  that over time some  pattern would 
stabilize that would  ensure  powerful  positions  would  receive  more of the good. 
The  absence  of  a  game-theoretic  core  suggests  that  no  stable  pattern  should 
emerge. 
Who Trades With Whom ? 
Only Elementary Theory makes a prediction about who will trade with whom. 
The core is empty  and there is more than one pattern satisfying group rationality. 
Therefore, the core and Shapley value do not predict a pattern. Position C initially 
has more power  than the other positions  and thus two outside  positions  are the 
first to form an agreement. Once this agreement has formed, the remaining triad 
consists  of three equal-power  positions.  The implication is that positions  A, B, D, 
and E should  have  a 5/6 probability of being included  in an exchange,  while  the 
central C position  should have only a 2/3 probability. The baseline random model 
is that the central position  should  have a slightly  greater probability, .821 versus 
.795, of being included in an exchange.3 
The actual results  showed  that the  central position  was  .186 less  likely to be 
included  in an exchange.  As a test  of Elementary Theory, this  difference is not 
significant  at the  .05 level  (t9 =  1.72). However,  the  actual difference  (-.186)  is 
significantly  different from the  baseline  random  difference (.026) at the  .05 level 
(t9  = 2.00). These results support Elementary Theory. 
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Who Gets More? 
Core:  Makes no predictions  since there is no core. 
Shapley  value:  A =  B =  D = E =  7.4, C =  11.6. 
Kernel: No power differences. 
Power/Dependence:  No power differences. 
Elementary  Theory: All trades should be between  equally powerful positions. 
The Shapley value predicts differences between  the positions, but the differences 
could be either due to C being included in more exchanges  or because it gets more 
in each exchange; the Shapley value does not tell us which  is the case. However, 
position  C cannot  average  12.8 without  earning  more  than  half the  points  in 
exchanges  with  A, B, D, or E. The core makes no prediction. The kernel, Power/ 
Dependence,  and Elementary Theory all predict equal exchanges. 
The three  theories  predicting  equal exchange  are wrong  in this  instance.  On 
average, C earned 3.79 more points than his/her trading partners, and this difference 
is significant  (a <  .05, one-tailed  t-test with  df =  9). This is consistent  with  the 
predictions of the Shapley value. 
It was also suggested  that coreless groups should be less stable in their coalition 
pattern. A reasonable measure of instability would  be the proportion of games in 
which the group changed  its coalition pattern. Unfortunately, these  experimental 
groups did not play enough  games  to estimate  the stability of coalition patterns. 
An examination of this issue will require experiments  in which  groups play more 
games. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The objective  of this  article was  to  show  that there  is a utility  in incorporating 
game theory  into the  discussion  of exchange  in negatively  connected  networks. 
This was achieved. The game-theory  models  did at least as well as the exchange- 
theory models.  In addition, there is much that game theory  can contribute to an 
understanding  of the processes  that the exchange-theory  solutions are insensitive 
to. Not only was it as successful  at correctly predicting where power was located 
in negatively  connected  networks than either of the exchange-theory  predictions, 
but it also provides  a basis for deciding when  there are any stable power relations 
to predict; coreless games should not have stable power relations. 
Table 6 is a summary of the performance of the different solutions. A plus "+" 
symbol shows that the theory was confirmed. A minus "-" means that the theory's 
predictions were incorrect, a plus/minus  shows  that the theory made both correct 
and  incorrect  predictions.  The  symbol  "---" shows  that  the  theory  made  no 
prediction. 
The first network, the four-person chain, confirmed the predictions  of both the 
game-theory-solution  and  power/dependence  theories.  Elementary  theory  was 
inaccurate in its prediction regarding which positions  would  exchange  and which 
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TABLE  6 
Summary  of Results  for all Theories  and All Networks 
4-Person  5-Person  4-Person  5-Person 
Chain  T  Hourglass  Chain  T  Hourglass 
Core  +  +  ---  +  +- 
Kernel  ---  ---  +  + 
Shapley  value  +  +  ---  +  + 
Power/Dependence  ---  ---  +  +  + 
Elementary theory  -  +  +  -  + 
Note: +  means  that the theory  was confirmed. 
-  means  that the theory's  predictions  were incorrect. 
?  means  correct  and incorrect  predictions. 
---  means  that the theory  made  no prediction. 
positions  would  be powerful. All the theories did about equally well on the five- 
person T network. There were the fewest  successful  predictions  about the figure 
without  a core, the hourglass. In many instances, no predictions were made, and 
in other cases, the predictions  were incorrect. As measured by the proportion of 
sucessful  predictions  (where  ?  counts  as  half a success),  the  only  completely 
successful  theory  is the core, closely  followed  by the Shapley value. Elementary 
Theory was the least successful. 
The main point we wish to make is that both the major sociological approaches 
to  exchange  networks,  Cook's  and  Markovsky's,  do  assume  rational behavior. 
Game theory offers a variety of sophisticated  rational-choice models for exchange 
networks  that perform at least as well and are worthy of further exploration. 
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NOTES 
1.  Further  extensions of the models presented  in this article  are described  in Bonacich 
and Bienenstock  (in press)  and Bienenstock  and Bonacich  (in press). 
2.  The Shapley value assumes complete "interpersonal  transfer  of utility."  This means 
that any coalition  can split its value between its members  in any way. This is not true in 
these exchange networks.  For example,  in network III,  v(ABCD)  = 48, but A =  B =  C = 
0, D = 48 is impossible.  This means that sometimes (for  example,  Network  II),  the Shapley 
value cannot occur. Our experience  is that this is not a major  problem  in its application 
as an ordinary  measure  of power. 
3.  In the baseline model, each position chooses randomly  from its alternative  trading 
partners.  Reciprocated  choices produce exchanges.  Positions that exchange are removed 
from  the network  and choices  are  made  by the remaining  positions  from  the reduced  graph. 
A game ends when no additional  exchanges  can be made. 
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